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ABSTRACT: Kant makes a much-unexpected confession in a much-unexpected place. In the 
Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology of the first Critique Kant accepts the 
irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory nature of all 
things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-conscious subject. The 
major Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei makes it impossible to conduct philosophical inquiry by 
assuming a self-conscious subject or “I,” which would potentially be in constant motion like 
other thoughts. For it rules out the possibility of completely detached reasoning which 
necessitates an unchanging state of mind. In this paper, Kaplama uses panta rhei to critically 
examine the philosophical shortcomings and contradictions of Kantian and Enlightenment 
ethics. In his examination, he specifically focuses on the teleological nature of Kant’s principle 
of freedom and ideal of moral autonomy which have dominated the Enlightenment thought. 
By doing so, he argues that it is essentially inaccurate to posit Überlegenheit (the state of being 
superior to nature) as the foundation of philosophical inquiry mainly because this would 
contradict the Enlightenment’s claim to constitute a rupture from classic and medieval 
metaphysics and would render Enlightenment a mere extension of Christian metaphysics. As in 
Christianity, Überlegenheit presupposes two separate realms, the actual (contingent) and ideal 
(pure) realms of thought and assumes that the transcendence commences from the level of the 
late metaphysical/teleological construction of the ‘subject’ who is completely persistent, self-
conscious and immune to change. He then substantiates these points with reference to the 
philosophical roots of ethnic prejudice displayed by the post-Enlightenment colonialists and the 
missionaries in Fiji and the Pacific. This brief critical examination of the post-Enlightenment 
ethnocentrism will be conducted under the following three points: a) On the Enlightenment’s 
teleological and universalistic understanding of humanity and the concept of progress versus 
the Fijian concepts of the continuity of life, regeneration, and reproduction b) On the 
Enlightenment’s ideal of the free-willing and independent individual subject versus the Fijian 
ideas of 'the cord', reciprocity, and vanua, and c) On the Enlightenment’s (and Christianity’s) 
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strict dualism between physics and metaphysics, nature and human mind, body and soul versus 
the Fijian bio-centrism, the sanctity of vanua and the cosmological concept of mana. 
KEYWORDS: Kant; Heraclitus; Enlightenment; Phusis; Ethos; Panta rhei; Change; Subject; 
Free-will; Transcendence; Universalism; Naturalism; Life; Vanua; Mana 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Kant makes a much-unexpected confession in a much-unexpected place. In the 
Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology of the first Critique Kant accepts 
the irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory 
nature of all things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-
conscious subject:  
“Even if the saying of some ancient schools, that everything is transitory and 
nothing in the world is persisting and abiding, cannot hold as soon as one 
assumes substances, it is still not refuted through the unity of self-consciousness. 
For we cannot judge even from our own consciousness whether as soul we are 
persisting or not, because we ascribe to our identical Self only that of which we 
are conscious; and so we must necessarily judge that we are the very same in the 
whole of the time of which we are conscious. But from the standpoint of someone 
else we cannot declare this to be valid because, since in the soul we encounter no 
persisting appearance other than the representation “I,” which accompanies and 
connects all of them, we can never make out whether this I (a mere thought) does 
not flow as well as all the other thoughts that are linked to one another through 
it.”1 
The major Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei makes it impossible to conduct 
philosophical inquiry by assuming a self-conscious subject or “I,” which would 
potentially be in constant motion like other thoughts. For it rules out the possibility of 
completely detached reasoning which necessitates an unchanging state of mind. 
However, Kantian-Enlightenment ethics requires an unchanging or completely 
detached reasoning, thus setting a certain predetermined telos for human behaviour 
1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p.424 (A364) 
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that ought to rule and regulate it. At stake here are the ideals of freedom and moral 
autonomy.  The ideal of freedom not only dominates the Enlightenment thought but 
also defines the ethical action/behaviour. An action is ethical only insofar as a free-
willing individual who acts based on the principles of detached reasoning conducts it. 
This reasoning must be detached from nature (phusis) in order to satisfy the criteria of 
the ideal of freedom. However, this predetermined telos (of freedom) contradicts 
another main argument of Enlightenment ethics, namely its critique of Christian 
asceticism or medieval metaphysics which is itself based on the detachment of human 
soul and reason from dynamic nature. Kant’s concept of Überlegenheit (the state of being 
superior or transcendence) refers to one’s ascending or going beyond his subjectivity 
(achieving purity and superiority). Thus Überlegenheit presupposes two separate realms, 
the actual (contingent) and ideal (pure) realms of self and the understanding. It 
assumes that the transcendence commences from the level of the late metaphysical 
construction of “the subject.” Due to the superiority (Überlegenheit) assigned to it, the 
notion of subject as well as human reason replace the God and the godly in classical 
and medieval metaphysics2 instead of generating a substantial rupture from the 
Christian tradition. Especially after Descartes, the modern philosophical 
argumentation is based on an either-or reasoning. In a strict and limited modern 
philosophical context, a way of thinking is either objective or subjective, either 
naturalist or rationalist, either empirical or speculative, either realist or idealist, either 
physical or metaphysical. Such arbitrary oppositions have contributed to the 
deepening of the large gap inherited from the traditional monotheistic religions based 
on the opposition between the physical world or nature and God and metaphysics. 
What then is needed to divert the philosophical reasoning from these ready-made 
opposing conceptions?  
Other than this difficult and generic problem, this article aims to give satisfactory 
responses to the following questions: How can we use the Heraclitean doctrine of 
change (panta rhei) to demonstrate the weaknesses and shortcomings of the Kantian and 
Enlightenment ethics? How can we use the Heraclitean doctrine of “it is in changing 
that things find their purpose” to provide an alternative to the teleological nature of 
the Enlightenment thought? What is the most crucial difference between the 
Enlightenment’s ideas of “progress” and “change”? Why is it philosophically 
important to distinguish them? How does the idea of progress itself entail the 
narrowing of Enlightenment’s Weltanschauung? How do Kantian ideas of moral 
autonomy and principle of freedom relate to “progress” rather than “change”?  What 
2 Erman Kaplama, Cosmological Aesthetics through the Kantian Sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian, UPA: Rowman 
& Littlefield, Lanham, 2014, p.12 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 146 
role does the principle of universality play in the formation of Kantian and 
Enlightenment ethics? What role does the idea of freedom play in the formation of 
Kantian and Enlightenment ethics? And how does this idea differ from the not-yet 
metaphysical (cosmological) idea of freedom? How do such Cartesian dualisms3 as 
internal-external, ideas-sense objects, mind/soul-body affect the prospect and telos of 
the Enlightenment project and Kantian ethics? How does Kant replace the purely 
metaphysical and teleological idea of God with the anthropocentric and teleological 
idea of free, autonomous and fully self-conscious human subject? How can we 
overcome the inherent contradiction between naturalism and rationalism? Why do we 
need to abandon teleological and theological epistemologies to achieve this? How does 
Kant’s teleological and dualistic move to justify such self-sufficient intelligible ideas as 
the categorical imperative, freedom and moral autonomy undermine his (and 
Enlightenment’s) zeal to break away from Cartesian dualisms and to mediate between 
rationalism and naturalism? 
I will then substantiate the responses to these questions with reference to a case 
study on the philosophical roots of ethnocentrism and ethnic prejudice displayed by 
the post-Enlightenment colonialists and missionaries in Fiji. This brief study will 
expose the shortcomings of the universalistic Kantian and Enlightenment ethics while 
demonstrating its contrasts with the Fijian ethos (which led to the misunderstanding of 
and prejudice towards the Fijian culture). However, in our examination, we need to be 
careful not to romanticize the Fijian ethos or over-emphasize the conceptual/spiritual 
aspects but rather focus on the ancient worldview embedded in the Fijian culture 
which may then be used to show its contrasts with the ideas and ideals imparted by the 
post-Enlightenment colonialists and Christian missionaries. This brief critical 
examination of the post-Enlightenment ethnocentrism will be conducted under the 
following three points: a) On the Enlightenment’s teleological and universalistic 
3 Descartes’ rationalism and his disbelief of the senses that maintained the irreconcilable separation 
between the external, sensible, material world and mind/ideas/metaphysics and God led to the following 
controversies that fed into the Enlightenment: “Are mind and body two distinct sorts of substances, as 
Descartes argues, and if so, what is the nature of each, and how are they related to each other, both in the 
human being (which presumably “has” both a mind and a body) and in a unified world system? If matter 
is inert (as Descartes claims), what can be the source of motion and the nature of causality in the physical 
world? And of course the various epistemological problems: the problem of objectivity, the role of God in 
securing our knowledge, the doctrine of innate ideas, et cetera.” (William Bristow. ‘Enlightenment’ in 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/) Retrieved on 
8/8/14 
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understanding of humanity and the concept of progress versus the Fijian concepts of 
the continuity of life, regeneration, and reproduction b) On the Enlightenment’s ideal 
of the free-willing and independent individual subject versus the Fijian ideas of “the 
cord”, reciprocity, and vanua, and c) On the Enlightenment’s (and Christianity’s) strict 
dualism between physics and metaphysics, nature and human mind, body and soul 
versus the Fijian bio-centrism, the sanctity of vanua and the cosmological concept of 
mana. 
SITUATING KANT IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT THOUGHT AND THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT IN KANTIAN THOUGHT: THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT, KANTIAN ETHICS AND DEONTOLOGY 
The Enlightenment is the culmination of major historical events and revolutions that 
took place in philosophy, science, politics and society in 17th and 18th century Europe. 
The common ground for all these events is their reactionary nature against the 
medieval Christian Weltanschaaung. This common ground is mainly structured on the 
teleological and rationalistic (and thereby universalistic) Enlightenment ideals of 
freedom, progress and equality. Particularly the scientific revolution made it 
compulsory for philosophers and social scientists to question not only the medieval 
theology and cosmology (as two branches of metaphysics) but also the dualistic 
presuppositions of medieval thought. This questioning led to Enlightenment’s zeal to 
generate a rupture from geocentric, religious conceptions of the cosmos to establish the 
philosophical principles of a new era of thinking based essentially on human rational 
capacity (rather than religion, tradition, culture and wisdom). In that sense, it is safe to 
say that the ideas of progress and change played an equally significant role in 
Enlightenment’s attempt to generate a rupture from the medieval worldview 
characterized by the Biblical and Socratic presumptions and dualisms. 
Despite these common principles, Enlightenment thought is a combination of 
rather disparate intellectual traditions such as French Encyclopédistes (D’Alembert, 
Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu), British empiricism (Hume, Locke and Hobbes), and 
German idealism and die Aufklärung (Leibniz, Wolff and Kant). This paper intends to 
focus on the latter in an attempt to provide an extensive critique of the main 
philosophical principles that underlie both the Enlightenment and Kantian thought 
and ethics in particular. Leibniz’s arguments “everything that exists has a sufficient 
reason for its existence” (see Kant’s principle of causality4) and the universe is fully 
4 Korsgaard doubts the validity of Kant’s principle of causality referring to the new discoveries in modern 
physics: “the principle that every event has a cause has been challenged by modern physics; modern 
scientists believe that at the level of the most fundamental particles and events it does not hold. An 
obvious question is what impact this has on Kant’s argument. Must he give up the idea that the causal 
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intelligible to human beings through our natural capacity of reasoning5 constitute the 
groundwork of German Enlightenment (die Aufklärung)6. Leibniz’s principle of sufficient 
reason informs and directs Enlightenment’s and Kant’s zeal to prove that the universe 
is fully intelligible to us through the exercise of our faculty of reason. It establishes the 
natural priority and supremacy of reason over other faculties, senses and intuitions. 
This is one of the reasons why the Enlightenment is otherwise called the Age of 
Reason (in contrast with the Medieval Age of Faith). However, attributing purpose to 
natural and mental phenomena, this principle also makes Kantian and Enlightenment 
ethics and philosophy in general teleological.  
Kant is seen by most of the post-Enlightenment philosophers as the Enlightenment 
thinker par excellence. He inherits one of his most important doctrines from the 
Enlightenment thought, namely the supreme authority of human reason or rational 
capacity which in turn grounds the basic principle of Kantian (deontological) ethics, 
namely the principle of moral autonomy. According to this principle, a choice is right 
if it conforms the moral norms that derive not from religion but from human 
reasoning capacity that each and every human individual possesses. In his What is 
Enlightenment? Kant articulates this as follows:  
“Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance 
of another...This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of 
understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance 
of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage 
to use your own understanding!... For enlightenment of this kind, all that is 
needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most innocuous form of all 
freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters. The public use of 
man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment 
among men; the private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly 
restricted, however, without undue hindrance to the progress of enlightenment”7.  
Kantian thought puts humanity (and human rationality) back in the center. 
Korsgaard, referring to Kant’s Groundwork, claims that the rational order metaphysics 
attempts to find in the world “is something which we human beings impose upon the 
principle is a synthetic a priori truth, or is it enough for his purposes that events at the macro-level must 
still be causally ordered if the world is to be knowable? For our purposes here, the causal principle may 
still be used as an example of a synthetic a priori truth” (Christine Korsgaard, ‘Introduction’, in 
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.xxxiv n.3) 
5 Wolff takes this principle one step further and attempts to theorize a rationalist metaphysical system to 
explain reality based on scientific truths and principles. (Bristow, ‘Enlightenment’) 
6 Bristow, ‘Enlightenment’ 
7 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?, Konigsberg, Germany, 1784, p.1  
                                                                                                                                                         
 ERMAN KAPLAMA 149 
world – in part through the way we construct our knowledge, but also, in a different 
way, through our actions”8 The central themes of Kant’s Groundwork constitute the 
main principles of Enlightenment ethics some of which are the intrinsic value of 
human subject, respect of our own humanity finding expression in our respect for that 
of others, the association of good with free-will and moral autonomy, and evil with 
enslavement9. This is how Kant justifies the relevance of the ideal of freedom in his 
system of thought. In fact, thanks to Kant, the ideal of freedom or principle of moral 
autonomy becomes so integral to the Enlightenment that it redefines the latter by 
becoming its ultimate telos. In What is Enlightenment? Kant articulates this telos as follows: 
“If it is now asked whether we at present live in an enlightened age, the answer is: 
No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment. As things are at present, we still 
have a long way to go before men as a whole can be in a position (or can ever be 
put into a position) of using their own understanding confidently and well in 
religious matters, without outside guidance. But we do have distinct indications 
that the way is now being cleared for them to work freely in this direction, and 
that the obstacles to universal enlightenment, to man's emergence from his self-
incurred immaturity, are gradually becoming fewer. In this respect our age is the 
age of enlightenment.”10 
The authority ascribed to human reason over and above religions11, beliefs, myths 
and traditions and a steadfast confidence in intellectual human faculties are very 
visible in the entirety of the Enlightenment thought. Any systematic or unsystematic 
religion needs to be opposed or criticized to overcome man’s self-incurred immaturity 
for the ultimate purpose of awakening his intellectual powers which should in turn lead 
to a better and more fulfilled existence12. Before Kant, another Enlightenment thinker, 
Rousseau identifies the accomplishment of human freedom as the ultimate  telos of 
Enlightenment though he leaves unexplained the problem of situating human freedom 
within cosmos. Kant wrestles with this problem in his entire philosophy from his 
earliest writings on metaphysics of nature to the three Critiques and finally comes up 
with the purely internal and rational principle of moral autonomy which rests on the 
presupposed dualism between nature and freedom.  
8 Korsgaard, ‘Introduction’, p.x 
9 Korsgaard, ‘Introduction’, p.x 
10 Kant, An Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?, p.4 
11 Kant defends this as follows: I have portrayed matters of religion as the focal point of enlightenment, 
i.e. of man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. This is firstly because our rulers have no 
interest in assuming the role of guardians over their subjects so far as the arts and sciences are concerned, 
and secondly, because religious immaturity is the most pernicious and dishonourable variety of all (Kant, 
An Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?, p.5) 
12 Bristow, ‘Enlightenment’ 
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According to Kant’s doctrine of moral autonomy, a choice is right if it conforms 
the moral norms that derive not from religion but from human reasoning capacity 
which distinguishes human beings from other animals. This is arguably the most 
important principle of Kantian ethics as it is designed to substantiate the idea and ideal 
of freedom. Human beings must be understood as fully self-conscious and morally 
autonomous beings who can exercise their will freely. This understanding evidently 
considers all human beings immune to change and persistent against so-called external 
historical events such as wars, starvation, famine, disasters and thereby potentially 
moral. Will, according to Kant, is always internal, and practical-moral principle is 
internally legislated. As aforementioned, Kant uses the term Überlegenheit or the state of 
being superior to the external, natural, bodily, historical and contextual factors that 
may influence the ethical decision, judgment and action of the “subject”. Treating 
human beings as ends-in-themselves, and acknowledging that human reason is to be 
valued in and for itself, things that are important to us such as science, art and 
philosophy are also to be valued in-themselves. All human desires, needs and wants 
must be transcended for the overarching telos of an ideal human community based on 
human rationality conceived above and beyond the contingent realm of nature13. This 
is also because Kant considers human nature as completely separate from nature by 
means of positing moral autonomy as against externally imposed laws of nature, God, 
or state (which are, according to Kant, contingent on the level of maturity of the given 
culture, society, tradition). This once more brings us back to Kant’s idea(l) of the fully 
autonomous moral human subject who imposes his own legislation and rules on the 
world while respecting others’ right to impose their own reasoning. This in turn reveals 
his pre-destined zeal to overcome his animal nature and establish his enlightened 
humanity (or namely the kingdom of ends14) through the principle of moral autonomy 
that underlies Kant’s universalism and cosmopolitanism.  
According to Kant, the good will is the only thing to which we attribute 
unconditional worth. Kant uses “good will” to substantiate his duty principle. This 
13 Korsgaard, ‘Introduction’, p.xxx-xxvi 
14 Kant describes the kingdom of ends as follows: “The concept of every rational being that must consider 
itself as universally legislating through all the maxims of its will, so as to judge itself and its actions from 
this point of view, leads to a very fruitful concept attached to it, namely that of a kingdom of ends. By a 
kingdom, however, I understand the systematic union of several rational beings through common laws. 
Now, since laws determine ends according to their universal validity, it is possible...to conceive a whole of 
ends (of rational beings as ends in themselves, as well as ends of its own that each of them may set for 
itself) in systematic connection, i.e. a kingdom of ends, which is possible according to the above principles. 
For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is to treat itself and all others never merely as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end in itself” (Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.45) 
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principle is essentially based on Kant’s fondness with the idea of genuine morality that 
originates from his attempt to preserve purity, innocence and good-heartedness of 
human will against potentially corrupting inclinations, desires and needs (one of the 
most important doctrines of the Judeo-Christian asceticism). According to Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative, one ought to act according to that practical law (maxim) 
whereby one can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.  This 
categorical imperative can only be cognized and willed by a rational, freethinking 
individual whose judgment, choice, decision, action is not conditioned by the 
“contingent” factors of the “external” nature (essentially consisting of objects of 
pleasure or displeasure and suffering or happiness). To prove that such objective and 
rationally acquired imperatives potentially exist for all human beings, Kant resorts to 
the principle of universalizability and argues that we ought to follow the practical laws 
based not on higher conditions (such as the will of God) but rather solely on the 
possibility to provide universal justifications for their validity. For, according to Kant, 
only within a will purified from all impulses and other possible contingent factors 
remains nothing but its conformity with the principle of universalizability15. 
HERACLITEAN CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN AND ENLIGHTENMENT ETHICS 
Kant replaces the purely metaphysical and teleological idea of God with the 
anthropocentric idea of subject or the idea of the “I”. In other words, he replaces the 
static theology with static teleology, in the sense that the free, autonomous and fully 
self-conscious human subject (who is fully persistent and thereby immune to change) is 
the ultimate purpose of the Kantian/Enlightenment ethics. And this very construal of 
human being, I argue, hinders Enlightenment’s purpose to generate a rupture from 
the traditional medieval theology and metaphysics as a whole. The idea of the 
“enlightened self” has been construed as the central telos of humanity since 
Enlightenment and this is problematic since the idea itself is a mere offshoot of the 
dualist Christian-Protestant metaphysics. Enlightenment remains to be as purpose-
oriented as the religious dogmas it is trying to overcome. The idea of change, which 
was essential to the 17th and 18th century philosophy that initiated the very idea of a 
rupture, was not followed to the end. Kant makes it clear that one should not appeal to 
any empirical source to justify a course of action and that such contingent and 
changing standards cannot constitute an objective categorical ground. But then, how 
can one be morally motivated solely on the basis of the universalizability of a rationally 
acquired ethical rule/law/norm? This problem arises in ethical studies not because it 
is supposed to arise and needs to be resolved, but rather because of the alleged 
15 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, p.17 
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separation between external nature and internal human reason that derives from the 
Cartesian and Christian dualistic understanding of human nature. On this Bristow 
says, 
“Through the postulation of a realm of unknowable noumena (things in 
themselves) over against the realm of nature as a realm of appearances, Kant 
manages to make place for practical concepts that are central to our 
understanding of ourselves even while grounding our scientific knowledge of 
nature as a domain governed by deterministic causal laws.”16 
As Bristow argues, Kant does this to make room for faith in such transcendental 
ideas as God, freedom and the soul by positing them over and against the realm of 
nature as a realm of appearances, which suddenly become separate from human 
rationality and the ideas generated by human reason17. Due to this, the appearances 
(which are essentially integral to the perception of the phenomena of nature) were 
reduced to their Cartesian dualistic definition. By the dualistic reconstruction of 
noumenal and phenomenal realms, Kant uses transcendentalism and the idea of 
Überlegenheit to pave the way to systematically justify the necessity to posit such 
intelligible ideas as God, freedom and the soul. This teleological move, however, 
renders his philosophy dualistic and thereby undermines his initial zeal to break away 
from Cartesian definitions and to mediate between rationalism and naturalism. 
According to Kant, morally autonomous individuals (potentially everyone) can 
transcend their contingent reality and reclaim their freedom. However, this 
teleologically constructed transcendence from contingent to pure realm of free-
thinking and willing (which originates from Judeo-Christian metaphysics as well as 
Buddhism) considers nature and freedom as completely separate realms that can never 
be reconciled. This is also because transcendence requires immunity to change. 
Therefore, Kantian ethics fails to situate humanity within the senseless motion of the 
cosmos and merely substitutes the Cartesian dualism of body and soul with its new 
dualism of nature and freedom18 instead of providing a real solution to overcome the 
16 Bristow, ‘Enlightenment’  
17 “Kant means his system to make room for humanity's practical and religious aspirations toward the 
transcendent as well. According to Kant's idealism, the realm of nature is limited to a realm of 
appearances, and we can intelligibly think supersensible objects such as God, freedom and the soul, 
though we cannot have knowledge of them” (Bristow, “Enlightenment”) 
18 In the third Critique, Kant compares these two domains as follows: “All facts belong either to the concept 
of nature, which proves its reality in the objects of the senses that are given (or can possibly be given) prior 
to all concepts of nature, or to the concept of freedom, which sufficiently proves its reality through the 
causality of reason with regard to certain effects in the sensible world possible by means of it, and which 
are irrefutably postulated in the moral law. The concept of nature (belonging merely to theoretical 
cognition) is either metaphysical and completely a priori or physical, i.e. a posteriori, and necessarily 
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dualisms inherent in Western philosophical tradition since Plato and the Judeo-
Christian metaphysics. Korsgaard argues, “a free person is one whose actions are not 
determined by any external force, not even by his own desires. This is merely a 
negative conception of freedom. But Kant thinks it points us towards a more positive 
conception of freedom”19. This understanding of nature as something “external” and 
as something that needs to be transcended echoes the Christian doctrine that pursuing 
strong desires/pleasures deprive one of having free will to follow God’s laws. And it is 
negative because our will becomes free only if we manage to overcome natural 
determination and our desires deriving from external causes. However, Kant then 
confesses the unavoidable flaw in his argumentation by admitting that the connection 
he tries to establish between free-willing individual and universal moral law is 
essentially circular and thereby cannot be used to explain the motivation behind our 
actions in-itself.  To overcome this problem, Kant appeals to his famous distinction 
between the noumenal (the world as it is in itself) and phenomenal world (the world as 
it appears to us) essentially claiming, “the world is given to us through our senses, it 
appears to us, and to that extent we are passive in the face of it. We must therefore think 
of the world as generating, or containing something which generates those 
appearances – something which is their source, and gives them to us. We can only 
know the world in so far as it is phenomenal, that is, in so far as it is given to the senses. 
But we can think of it as noumenal”20. Here, Kant evidently appeals to the Cartesian 
dualism between sense-perceptions (that constitute the phenomenal world) and 
rational ideas (that constitute the noumenal world), and as Descartes does, Kant also 
declares the latter to be the real world (and thereby the former to be the illusory one). 
This, Kant explains, is because the sense-perceptions, through which we perceive the 
world as it appears to us, are essentially passive and the subject simply finds himself 
surrounded and affected (Empfindung) by worldly phenomena. He also adds that the 
good based on practical laws needs to be distinguished from the agreeable, “as that which 
influences the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, which 
hold only for the senses of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which 
holds for everyone.”21By distinguishing between these two worlds (the phenomenal and 
noumenal realms), Kant aims to establish that human beings, as the members of the 
noumenal world, are or at least have the potential to become free and autonomous. 
conceivable only by means of determinate experience. The metaphysical concept of nature (which 
presupposes no determinate experience) is therefore ontological.” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.339) 
19 Korsgaard, ‘Introduction’, p.xxix 
20 Korsgaard, ‘Introduction’, p.xxxi 
21 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, p.27 
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This is the point of argumentation where Kant’s definition of noumenal, autonomous, 
moral and free subject acquires the characteristics that are originally attributed to the 
Judeo-Christian God. Kant says, “...whence do we have the concept of God, as the 
highest good? Solely from the idea that reason a priori devises of moral perfection, and 
connects inseparably with the concept of a free will”22. However, if we accept this 
rather stipulated argumentation, there arises another problem: how are we to ground 
the world of sense (phenomenal world) and its laws on the world of understanding (noumenal 
world)? In other words, how can the laws of phusis (nature) be grounded on the 
principles/laws/imperatives of ethos? I argue that this so-called necessary dualism 
derives from Kant’s teleological misinterpretation of the so-called phenomenal world 
in which our actions are determined. This was Kant’s attempt to prove the necessity of 
imposing a rational order on the natural world of sense through our higher 
universalizable and moral principles. But here, because of his dualistic definition of 
nature and freedom, once more Kant’s proof falls rather short of proving his main 
argument that moral laws of the noumenal realm of ideas ground the phenomenal 
realm of nature, which requires us to neglect nature’s dynamic, unpredictable, 
changing, irrational and overabundant character.  Everything acquired through our 
senses such as our experience of change and life itself is therefore considered in 
Kantian ethics as impure and non-intellectual, and it is our responsibility as rational 
morally autonomous beings to purify our thoughts and ideas from our outer/external 
needs, desires and experiences so as to reach an a priori higher consciousness of our 
inner/internal noumenal world through transcendence. This thought is evidently 
reminiscent of the Judeo-Christian idea of purity and asceticism which Kant uses to 
found his principle of good will.  
But, how can an ethically correct judgment be by its nature erroneous just because 
it does not stem from good will? This can only be justified if and when we consider 
willing as something entirely isolated from the action itself and this perspective derives 
from the very dualism between nature and freedom. However, once we reinstate 
freedom and human ability of reasoning back on where they originally derive from, 
namely nature itself, acting and willing can no longer be considered as entirely 
disparate. This is because while conduct may affect and change the will of the person 
doing it, the will of the person can also regulate and determine not only the outcome 
but also the very execution of the conduct itself. Therefore, once we obliterate the 
dualism between nature and freedom (or contingency and free-will), thinking, willing 
and acting can be intertwined into one good or bad way of conduct, and they are 
subject to change while the action is being conducted. Here, the most obvious example 
22 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, p.23 
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we can provide is the action of “living” itself. One cannot possibly plan out one’s life 
based on a certain free-will or categorical principle (to have a good life) and expect 
each and every event to turn out exactly as expected. So, during the conduct of living, 
one has to think, rethink, will and act spontaneously on the dynamic background of 
life itself, and goodness of the life led by one is determined by how well one links, 
balances and brings together his thoughts, intentions and actions into a whole. This 
viewpoint would also tie in with  the Heraclitean principles of panta rhei and “it is in 
changing that things find their purpose” as it considers the thought “I” as part of the 
action of “living” itself instead of assuming it to have a superior (elevated) existence of 
its own outside of nature or phusis. While living and thereby changing, human beings 
not only find their purpose in life but also reconsider their wills, thoughts and 
judgments during which they become not objective nor universal nor free but rather 
wise. This brings us to another problematic principle of the deontological ethics, 
namely the Categorical Imperative. 
According to Kant’s principle of the Categorical Imperative, the purity of our 
respect for the relevant practical law (maxim) can be assessed based on the principle of 
universalizability which determines whether or not an action is purely motivated by 
our respect for humanity. Kant provides several scenarios in the Groundwork to explain 
this principle such as borrowing money on the strength of a false promise. One 
problem that immediately arises with such scenarios is that the individual ‘subject’ 
imagines them as if isolated in a timeless and spaceless box (a realm where all other 
temporal and spatial factors are considered irrelevant). However, in reality in a 
constantly changing world, there are several judgments, decisions, actions, and factors 
that constantly affect each other. It is possible to provide unlimited versions of flow of 
events that take place (or may potentially take place) in real worldly life. This would 
make it impossible to have such set of rules, norms, and maxims. From a Heraclitean 
point of view, we can resolve this problem by opting for flexible principles that can be 
and should be open to interpretation (and reinterpretation) while according with phusis 
and the principle of change which would in turn allow for diverse cultural-ethical 
(spatial and temporal) perspectives. Moreover, willing the world of the universalized 
maxim itself makes an action (acted in accordance with the Categorical Imperative) 
teleological or purpose-oriented thus contradicting Kant’s principle of non-
consequentialism. Since the rational individual is supposed to will the world in which 
everyone acts according to the universalizable laws of human reason, achieving this 
ideal realm of pure reason itself becomes the very telos of humanity (idea of human 
community that transcends all needs, desires and pleasures above and beyond the 
contingent realm of nature), and of all autonomously judged, decided, conducted 
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actions of free-willing individuals. Therefore, Kant becomes obliged to posit this telos of 
enlightened community of free and moral autonomous human beings guided by 
universalizable principle in order to justify his doctrines of good will, moral autonomy 
and categorical imperative. Since this teleological approach is essentially structured on 
the dualism between nature and freedom, it also fails to revolutionize the traditional 
metaphysics but rather reforms it by replacing God with noumenal realm of rational 
and moral individual subjects, religious willing with rational/intellectual willing, and 
the telos of achieving (through good deeds) the pure realm of God with the telos of 
achieving (through good will) the kingdom of ends.  
PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF ETHNOCENTRISM OF THE POST-
ENLIGHTENMENT COLONIALISTS AND MISSIONARIES IN FIJI BASED ON THE 
HERACLITEAN CRITIQUE OF ENLIGHTENMENT ETHICS AND THE FIJIAN 
ETHOS 
On the Enlightenment’s teleological and universalistic understanding of humanity and the concept of progress 
versus the Fijian concepts of the continuity of life, regeneration, and reproduction. 
Kant, giving an example on the duties of human beings deriving from the universal 
law of nature (namely the Categorical Imperative, ‘act as if the maxim of your action 
were to become your will’), indirectly demeans the cultural values of the South Sea 
Islanders (namely the people of the South Pacific) thereby revealing his ethnic 
prejudice: 
“A third (man) finds himself a talent that by means of some cultivation could 
make him a useful human being in all sorts of respects. However, he sees himself 
in comfortable circumstances and prefers to give himself up to gratification rather 
than to make the effort to expand and improve his fortunate natural 
predispositions. Yet, he still asks himself: whether his maxim of neglecting his 
natural gifts, besides its agreement with his propensity to amusement, also agrees 
with what one calls duty. Now he sees that a nature could indeed still subsist 
according to such a universal law, even if human beings (like South Sea Islanders) 
should let their talents rust and be intent on devoting their lives merely to 
idleness, amusement, procreation, in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot 
possibly will that this become a universal law of nature, or as such be placed in 
us by natural instinct. For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all 
capacities in him be developed, because they serve him and are given to him for 
all sorts of possible purposes”23 
23 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, p.35 
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This example reveals the philosophical roots of this prejudice based on the 
dualistic understanding of human nature, the supremacy of reason/rationality over 
life, and the idea of the universal truth. The very reasons behind the prejudice of the 
post-Enlightenment Europeans are the deified ideas like freedom and progress. In 
contrast, enjoyment, amusement and procreation are considered as sin by the 
Protestant morality and as wasteful and irrational by Enlightenment and Kantian 
ethics. Therefore, the cultures of the South Sea Islanders look barbaric or sinful to 
post-Enlightenment colonialists and missionaries. For instance, Brantinger, in his 
recently published book Taming the Cannibals, recounts the accounts of Wesleyan 
missionaries of Fijian culture as follows: “Atrocities of the most fearful kind have come 
to my knowledge, which I dare not record here”. They called these the unspeakable 
and hellish misbehavior. Moreover, missionaries also referred to warfare, cannibalism, 
torture, infanticide, widow strangling, and treacherous murder in their drawings 
regarding the Fijian culture”24. The Enlightenment’s and Kant’s zeal to establish the 
validity of the universal ethical standards, the dominance of the idea of progress over 
change, the understanding of freedom as an ‘idea’ as well as an ‘ideal’ which is and has 
to be detached from nature (phusis) and thereby from ‘change’, and the entailing 
teleological understanding of human life and ethos constitute the grounding for 
European ethnocentrism and prejudice towards indigenous cultures. According to 
Brantinger, Enlightenment thinkers did not stress cultural over natural factors, which 
is why they did not, and could not grasp the possibility of different understandings of 
such concepts as history (cyclical rather than progressive), life and change and instead 
believed in the progress of cultural refinement.25 As Brantinger states, both Kant and 
Hegel thought that the people of Africa and South Pacific (alongside other indigenous 
cultures) had no sense of history simply referring to the Western idea of history based 
on progress. 
Asesela Ravuvu’s book, The Fijian Ethos is based on a research focusing on the vanua 
of three inland villages in Viti Levu (Lutu, Matainasau and Laselevu). It is one of the 
few academic studies that try to understand the Fijian worldview, philosophy and way 
of life by looking at the ethical, social, political and religious concepts and ideas used in 
traditional Fijian ceremonies. Drawing on one of the ceremonies he recorded, Ravuvu 
underlines the importance of unity, solidarity, regeneration (fertility) and continuity of 
life in Fijian culture as well as the human beings and their relationships that constitute 
and secure this continuity by quoting the speech of a junior chief of Nakoidrau offering 
sevusevu to the men of Navunitivi: 
24 Patrick Brantinger, Taming Cannibals: Race and the Victorians, Cornell University Press, 2011, p.231 
25 Brantinger, Taming Cannibals: Race and the Victorians, pp.4-5 
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“We are only requesting that human beings will flourish in our establishment, 
and that life, with us, be preserved. Let our noble abode be strongly established, 
your abode, siblings, parents and your progeny, the holding together of our 
mutual existence...I, your child, continually say, that the magiti, like everything 
else, is of no substance. The thing which is of great importance is the person. 
When the chief has little material wealth, it is the people who will make up for it. 
The vanua must be strengthened and affirmed.”26  
From this speech Ravuvu derives the conclusions that according to Fijian ethos, 
human beings are to be valued not in and for themselves but rather as the members of 
the vanua and through their relations with each other as long as the continuity of life 
and vanua maintained through unity and regeneration. The people that constitute it 
must continually strengthen the vanua in order to preserve their values not as 
individuals but as the members of the vanua which gives them their identity. This idea 
radically contrasts the Kantian idea of human beings as free-willing rational 
individuals who have the capacity to rationalize and universalize and who must 
therefore be valued in and for themselves. Moreover, this also shows how unimportant 
the ideas of progress and freedom are with regard to Fijian ethos which is rather 
centered on the continuity of life and preservation of vanua through regeneration and 
unity. As long as the needs of the present situation are fulfilled and difficulties are 
handled unitedly and with care, vanua remains united and all its members are provided 
with prosperous life. On the other hand, as the junior chief of Nakoidrau says, if the 
unity among members of the vanua is not maintained, reaffirmed and redefined to 
accommodate changing circumstances, and the new forces are not handled properly, 
the vanua is doomed to suffer27. Therefore, the ultimate purposes of the Fijian ethos are 
not progress and individual independence but rather the continuity of life, 
interdependence of the people and preservation of the identity of vanua.  
On the Enlightenment’s ideal of the free-willing and independent individual subject versus the Fijian ideas of “the 
cord”, reciprocity, and vanua 
Another Enlightenment thinker, Locke argued that the indigenous people did not have 
a sense of property (as they did not cultivate their lands) and thereby their lands could 
be considered as wastelands. This argument allowed the colonizers to declare these 
lands terra nullius thereby formally denying the very existence of Aborigines’ rights over 
26 Asesela Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South Pacific, 
Suva, Fiji, 1987, p.248 
27 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, p.248 
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Australian land28. On the other hand, as against Locke’s argument, the Fijian concept 
of vanua, generally translated in English as “land”, stands not only for the 
physical/phenomenal concept of land and its people but also for the values, beliefs and 
customs that have been cultivated on the land for the sake of achieving prosperity, 
solidarity and harmony. While vanua belongs to the people living on and through it, 
people and their customs and identity are the extensions of their vanua on which they 
dwell, live, regenerate and reproduce. In other words, vanua, as a cultural and 
philosophical concept, shapes and is in turn shaped by the ethos of the people dwelling 
on and living through it. These links or “cords” between people and vanua (also 
between different yavusa and mataqali) are constantly mentioned in Fijian ceremonies. 
With his continuous affirmation of the need to revitalize and strengthen the existing 
kinship bonds, the junior chief of Nakoidrau emphasizes “the socio-economic 
interdependence in terms of reproduction for the sake of the vanua”. Thus, continues 
Ravuvu,  
“Kinship was used to culturally define an interdependence (of the two 
vanua)...related to human reproduction and the regeneration of other resources 
which enhance the continuity of life and prosperity of the two vanua. Intergroup 
marriages, adoptions and the reciprocal transfer of resources keep such 
relationships alive. The children from previous marriages between the members 
of the two groups provide the link among them from one generation to the next. 
Historical and mythological relationships are revitalized to enable current 
problems to be faced jointly”29.  
This idea of “interdependence” very much resembles one of the principles of the 
universal theory of care ethics according to which all individuals are interdependent 
for achieving their interests. For human beings are social animals who cannot and 
should not prioritize their self-interest, and their well-being is determined by the well-
being of those around them including the well-being of their environment animals, 
plants, rivers, oceans and lands. Similarly, in Fijian ethos, while positive relationship is 
defined by such concepts as reciprocation, recognition, respect, appreciation, 
strengthening of the bond, incorporation, unity, continuity, the negative relationship 
may be caused by and/or lead to non-reciprocation, non-recognition, lack of respect 
and appreciation, weakening and breaking of the bond, separation and disunity and 
eventually discontinuity30.  In Fijian culture, the concept-object that represents the 
characteristics of positive relationship such as reciprocation, respect, strengthening of 
the bond and continuity is the cord or namely tabua (whale’s tooth). Such chiefly 
28 Brantinger, Taming Cannibals: Race and the Victorians, pp.4-5 
29 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, p.247-8 
30 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, p.250 
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ceremonial objects as tabua symbolize the wishes, goodwill and feelings of their donors 
as well as the respect and appreciation between two parties (individuals or groups). 
Tabua with a cord is the most sacred ceremonial offering that not only embodies all 
chiefly values but also possesses a mystical power, as it is believed to be endowed with 
mana or power to effect good or ill when offered and accepted. It is thus believed by the 
Fijians that each tabua has an intrinsic value that changes in accordance with the 
circumstances as well as the relation between the two parties offering and receiving it. 
Other names often used to represent tabua are kamunaga (valuable), vatu (stone or rock), 
and wawa (cord)31. Here, the concept of the cord among others is conceptually crucial 
as it reveals the nature of tabua as the symbol of reciprocity that not only attaches one 
mataqali, yavusa, vanua to another but also the members of the vanua to life and their 
ancestral past to their prosperous future. Thereby, tabua also represents a sense of 
temporal and spatial interdependence and unity as opposed to individuality and free-
will. For instance, in formally accepting the qalovi (whale’s tooth for welcoming), 
Navunitivi chief makes the following speech:  
“Cord for life, the qalovi for the vanua...May this truly be heard by the yavutu 
(house-site of founding ancestor), do truly listen to it siblings, parents and your 
offspring. These siblings have been entreating that there should be a second to 
the child of Visala, the reason for the cord which being proffered 
today...Through this tabua, it is being requested that the progeny for the vanua 
shall flourish. It is a cord for existence, cord for co-operation. Let us be of one 
spirit only, siblings, parents, and your progeny. May the path of the vanua 
continue to be clear”32 
It is apparent in this speech that tabua or the “cord for life” represents not only the 
oneness of the members of the vanua through cooperation but also their spatial links to 
the underlying life-force through their very existence, and this existence can only be 
secured if the path of the vanua continue to be clear which requires not independence 
of its members but rather the affirmation of their interdependence. Moreover, tabua 
also functions as the temporal link between the founding ancestors (who are believed 
to be present and observing every ceremony) and the present and future (parents and 
offspring) of the vanua. Evidently, the belief in these temporal and spatial links are not 
founded on a dualistic understanding between the physical environment or nature and 
metaphysical concept or human mind or soul, but rather on life and vanua itself as both 
physical and metaphysical idea-object.  
31 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, pp.22-23 
32 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, p.253 
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On the Enlightenment’s (and Christianity’s) strict dualism between physics and metaphysics/nature and human 
mind/body and soul versus the Fijian bio-centrism, the sanctity of vanua and the cosmological concept of mana 
I have so far discussed two important aspects of the concept of vanua, both in terms of 
its relevance and importance for the continuity of life, regeneration, and reproduction 
in Fijian ethos and in terms of its unifying character that renders the members of vanua 
interdependent and thereby ensures reciprocity and cooperation. Another important 
aspect of vanua, as a cultural and philosophical idea-object, is that it constitutes not 
only the physical land on which Fijians live, eat, dwell and regenerate but also their 
particular worldview (Weltanschauung). Ravuvu states that vanua also encompasses the 
common values and beliefs of a particular culture about life in natural and 
supernatural world. Therefore, he continues, 
 “An appreciation...of the cultural vanua permits insights into people’s actions and 
how they bear on their efforts to live and resolve the exigencies of existence both 
in this earthly world and in the world of the spirit beings who can protect and 
destroy, or direct and make possible what is required for life. For to live well in 
this world and in the other world, one has to live according to vanua beliefs and 
values. Thus the concept of vanua is an encompassing one; it is the totality of a 
Fijian community. Used in various contexts, it can refer alternatively to the social 
and physical environments, or to the supernatural world, or to all the elements 
which make life occur”33  
Accordingly, vanua is the representation of the unity of earthly-physical and 
spiritual-metaphysical life as well as the unity of all members of the vanua. However, 
this understanding does not construe vanua as a dualistic concept but rather it shows its 
cosmological character that encompasses not only the social-physical environments 
(e.g. lands, oceans, rivers) but also the elements of the supernatural world of spirits and 
life forces (e.g. spirits of the ancestors, deities) who are believed to have the power to 
affect, direct and sustain life in earthly realm. Ravuvu adds referring to the ceremonies 
he attended, the chief himself is believed to be the personification of the vanua (which 
embodies the ethos of the people). Every member of a vanua is identified with the chief, 
as the embodiment or representative of vanua and this, says Ravuvu, is epitomized in 
such proverbs as “Na turaga na vanua; na vanua na turaga” (the chief is the vanua; the vanua 
is the chief) and “Na turaga na tamata; na tamata na turaga” (the chief is of the people; the 
people are the chiefs). “These common Fijian aphorisms define the close relationship 
between the people and their chief. Each exists for the other, and both are the 
embodiment of their ancestral gods and spirits in earthly life and in ceremonial”34. In 
some of the ceremonial gatherings, the visiting chief undergoes a process of 
33 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, pp.14-15 
34 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, p.234 
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transformation through a series of transitional rites in which he ceremonially dies or 
separates himself from the earthly life. These rites are performed to make sure that the 
visiting chief safely regenerates his life-giving power and to “prepare the chief for the 
final rites of incorporation (qaloqalovi, sevusevu and yaqona vakaturaga rites) under which 
he is to be ultimately transformed and reborn into a sacred being or god with 
supernatural qualities”35. The dual (both mortal and immortal) character of the chief, 
who is seen as the embodiment of his ancestral gods among his people, is consistent 
with the concept of vanua. In the qaloqalovi ceremony for instance the ancestral spirit 
gods (as essential components of the present vanua) are invited to land to attend the 
ceremony together with their descendants by shifting of the anchor of their sacred 
canoe36. Therefore, it would not be wrong to conclude that vanua, people and their 
chiefs are the earthly extensions of the underlying metaphysical entities that culminate 
in the idea-object of life (which is arguably comparable to the Heraclitean phusis) and 
this connection is revealed through the transitory events of ceremonial gatherings. 
However, Ravuvu states, “the belief in the chief as a god incarnate has been 
undermined by Christianity”37. This is because while Christianity is based on the 
irreconcilable (or hardly reconcilable) duality between body and soul, or earthly and 
spiritual, the concept of vanua personified by the chief is founded on the very transition 
represented by ceremonial gatherings between the earthly and the spiritual through 
which the duality is overcome.  
Another important distinguishing idea present in the Fijian and all Melanesian and 
Polynesian cultures in contrast with the Enlightenment and Christian thought is the 
idea of mana. According to Blust, mana originally referred to the physical forces of 
nature such as storm winds and thunder but then, especially in the islands of the South 
Pacific, it became detached from these dynamic forces of nature and began to 
represent a supernatural or supersensible idea38. There were many academically failed 
attempts by scholars to conceptualize mana as a universal idea representing sacred life-
force which can be found in all cultures. The Melanesian (hence Fijian) concept of 
mana represents a sacred impersonal energy that can exist in (and can be transmitted 
to/from) all living and lifeless objects including people, animals, plants, charms and 
amulets and that determines success and luck of the person, family or community 
(mataqali, yavusa, vanua). As aforementioned, in Fijian culture, mana also plays an 
35 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, pp.240-1 
36 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, p.242 
37 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, 254-5 
38 Robert Blust, ‘Proto-Oceanic Mana Revisited’. Oceanic Linguistics, Volume 46, Number 2, December 
2007, p.404 
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important role in the transformation (elevation) of the chief to the spirit world of the 
ancestral gods. As Ravuvu states, once installed as a chief, “his words and acts become 
charged with mana (power to effect) and henceforth he has the power to satisfy the 
wishes of those who petition him...”39. As the chief drinks the first cup of yaqona or as 
Ravuvu calls, the elixir of immortality, he “was reborn and embodied with mana to effect 
life”40. Yaqona, in this sense, by initiating the transition, completes the act of 
communion between the mortal and immortal world and bestows mana to the 
previously pacified guest chief and this process of transition must be handled with 
utmost care, caution and apprehension to make sure that the chief is actually prepared 
to bear the flow of life-force or mana he garners from the immortal world41. The life-
force gathered by the chief (who experiences a two-way transition between mortality 
and immortality) during the process of transition is believed to bring strength and 
integrity to the person and harmony and prosperity to his community and 
environment. Therefore, the concept or idea-object of mana acquires a cosmological 
meaning irrespective of the dualities between the natural and supernatural, 
phenomena and noumena. Such cosmological ideas as mana, vanua, tabua, reciprocity and 
the continuity of life exemplify so-called “amoral” and “irrational” elements (as coined by 
the Enlightenment and secular thought) of the indigenous worldviews including the 
Fijian ethos that managed or at least attempted to posit humanity and human conduct 
on the constantly changing and recurring landscape of phusis. 
CONCLUSION 
Although unsuccessful, Kant’s attempt to mediate between the Cartesian dualisms still 
stands as one of the most important attempts to situate humanity and human freedom 
in cosmos and justify human existence (as morally free, perfectible and self-conscious) 
in nature. Yet, this is thanks to Kant’s quasi-scientific critical methodology rather than 
his teleological doctrines. On the other hand, as aforesaid, the answers Kant provides 
do not suffice to fuel the Enlightenment thought to break free from the pre-established 
notions of the medieval theology and teleology. And this is one of the reasons why 
Enlightenment was limited both temporally and spatially, as it had to end as a 
historical period in the 19th century and it remained to be Euro- and anthropocentric 
until now. This also explains the overt and covert ethnic prejudices displayed by the 
colonialists and missionaries against Fijian and other indigenous cosmologies. 
Rationalism inherent in Enlightenment did not manage to define a new ratio according 
39 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, p.239 
40 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, p.242 
41 Ravuvu, The Fijian Ethos, 243-4 
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to which new concepts and ideas could be generated and change or rupture could be 
achieved. It rather got stuck in such teleological ideals as “enlightened self”, individual 
freedom, persistent, disinterested and rational subject as well as reformed 
Protestantism and secularism, thereby failing to understand the philosophical 
significance of ancient indigenous concepts and ideas. Therefore, alongside all its 
reactionary ideals, the Enlightenment failed to overcome its reactionary identity 
against Christian metaphysics, ethics and politics. This, I argue is partly because Kant 
(arguably the most successful ethicist of the Enlightenment) simply failed to overcome 
the inherent pre-established contradiction between naturalism and rationalism. He did 
not manage to discover an approach that would not only reconcile these approaches 
but also generate a new Weltanschauung that would stop thinking through such dualisms 
as nature and reason, body and soul which would in turn help Enlightenment achieve 
its main goal of overcoming the exhausted metaphysical, teleological and theological 
ideas such as God, truth and progress. For only then, he could have managed to 
provide a new answer to the question “how does humanity itself fit into the cosmos?” 
Finally, only if we try to replace the purpose-oriented teleological methods of 
questioning (seeking truth, certainty, provability of God or destination), with not-yet-
metaphysical, non-teleological and rather cosmological understanding, will we be able 
to provide satisfactory answers to this question, which would be acceptable both on 
rationalist-metaphysical and on empiricist-naturalist grounds by disregarding their 
alleged independence.  
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